Fri, 2017-12-22

Abstract

The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) in collaboration with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) organised a two and a half-day workshop on expert support and reachback entitled Magic Maggiore at the JRC Ispra, Italy in 28-30 March 2017.
Through a series of presentations, case studies, panel discussions, and a demonstration exercise, Magic Maggiore helped raise awareness and build commitment towards technical reachback. Furthermore, the workshop presented best practices to address key challenges, and identified areas for future work in this field. The workshop included a real-time detection and reachback exercise of a hypothetical nuclear security incident, put on between the JRC (Ispra) and France (Paris). The demonstration focused on core components of alarm adjudication and information exchange between front-line officers, a national reachback centre, and an advanced centralised reachback centre located in Paris.
A list of concrete post-workshop activities has been generated. The purpose of the list is to pave the way for the identification of the next steps towards development of European capabilities for nuclear security and in more general, for CBRNE security.
Reachback is necessary for alarm adjudication to provide timely information for a balanced response. Information sharing between competent authorities is of vital importance for nuclear security. Due to the variety of responsibilities, Technical, Scientific and Operational support needs to be defined. The Member States should consider developing joint protocols on data structures and data handling to ease the information flow and so the response time.

Wed, 2016-03-16

Abstract

As part of its 2015 work programme, the RN thematic group collected views from the EU Member States regarding this report as a key step in the work towards future European format and protocol standardisation to be implemented for technical reachback and other analysis purposes.

The group designed a simple questionnaire, which was sent to the relevant authorities in the Member States. The answers (10 out of 28) came from very different organisations working in the domains of security, safety or the military. The different backgrounds of the responding organisations show that responsibility for nuclear and radiological matters, including information sharing in a nuclear security event, varies strongly between different Member States. This knowledge alone is an important outcome of the questionnaire.

Some replies showed that much work needs to be done in raising European awareness regarding the prevention and detection of and the response to nuclear security events, including information sharing nationally and internationally. Some Member States have not yet identified the need for cooperation in sharing nuclear spectrometric data and analysis results.

One of the basic requirements of the proposed new information-sharing system for nuclear security is that advanced national analysis resources be provided for Member States that do not have such capabilities. Even though the future arrangements for information sharing would be based on a standard technological structure, all data exchange would be voluntary and bilateral between the Member States.

Wed, 2016-03-16

Abstract

Operational systems for nuclear security in Finland, France, Denmark, UK, US and Canada were reviewed. The Finnish case is a holistic approach to Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency; reachback is only one component of the system, albeit an important crosscutting element of the detection architecture. The French and US studies concentrate on the reachback itself. The Danish nuclear security system is information-driven, relying on the cooperation of the competent authorities. The British and Canadian analyses describe nuclear security planning and operations in a major public event (MPE), the Olympics, where cooperation between the frontline officers and the reachback centre plays a key role in reducing radiological and nuclear risks.

For the implementation of an efficient reachback system there is a strong need for standardising the data acquisition, storing and final distribution of the analysis results. Major nuclear powers take this activity very seriously, and they have 24/7, all-year national service for information processing. The case studies of Finland and France show that efficient European reachback is manageable and technically possible on a country-wide basis. The case study on Denmark reveals that countries with limited reachback resources need an adequate and standardised technical information-sharing mechanism to aid their national analysis services in a precise and timely manner.

Mon, 2015-03-09

Abstract

Strengthening chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) security in the European Union (EU) reduces the threat of and damage from CBRNE incidents. One of the main issues facing the EU security industry is its highly fragmented nature, exhibiting a lack of standardisation and of harmonised certification procedures. The need for standardised information sharing between competent authorities and international bodies regarding radiation measurements and data analysis has been recognised by several experts in response to Commission mandate M/487 for the establishment of European security standards. This report will suggest a way forward to develop protocols for more efficient cooperation between competent authorities and remote expert support or reachback centres at the national and international level. Not all EU Member States have the capabilities to process data provided by nuclear security instruments, and thus should consider instigating a coordinated capability yielding a more efficient and comprehensive approach in responding to future nuclear emergencies. This could be achieved by reachback centres across Europe (built upon existing national facilities and expertise) and would provide analysis services for alarm adjudication. Efficient data sharing and processing across EU Member States requires the use of standard data formats and protocols.