National reachback systems for nuclear security

Abstract

Operational systems for nuclear security in Finland, France, Denmark, UK, US and Canada were reviewed. The Finnish case is a holistic approach to Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency; reachback is only one component of the system, albeit an important crosscutting element of the detection architecture. The French and US studies concentrate on the reachback itself. The Danish nuclear security system is information-driven, relying on the cooperation of the competent authorities. The British and Canadian analyses describe nuclear security planning and operations in a major public event (MPE), the Olympics, where cooperation between the frontline officers and the reachback centre plays a key role in reducing radiological and nuclear risks.

For the implementation of an efficient reachback system there is a strong need for standardising the data acquisition, storing and final distribution of the analysis results. Major nuclear powers take this activity very seriously, and they have 24/7, all-year national service for information processing. The case studies of Finland and France show that efficient European reachback is manageable and technically possible on a country-wide basis. The case study on Denmark reveals that countries with limited reachback resources need an adequate and standardised technical information-sharing mechanism to aid their national analysis services in a precise and timely manner.