

Survey of national authorities responsible for drinking water on water security plans

Robert Pitchers

WRc plc, Swindon, UK.

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Approach and Objectives

- Survey by questionnaire submitted to Critical Infrastructure Protection representatives from all Member States.
- The purpose of the survey was to:
 - determine the status in Member States of drinking water supply as a critical infrastructure in national risk assessments,
 - identify, in broad terms, the extent to which security measures have been implemented, and
 - obtain views from Member States on the requirement for further activities at EU level.
- Replies were received from 15 Member States
- Responses were collated and compiled into a summary report

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Legislation and Organisation

- Drinking water is considered a critical infrastructure by nearly all respondents.
- Most Member States reported that Health Ministries have primary responsibility for governing the quality of drinking water although responsibility is sometimes shared between other departments.
- Implementation of the provisions of legislation is often devolved to regional authorities.
- Legislation primarily governs water quality although some Member States have additional requirements for security of drinking water but in separate legislation.

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Risk Assessment

- Several Member States restricted the requirement for a risk assessment based on size of asset.
- Specifically, reference was made to Drinking Water Safety Plans (World Health Organization) or Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point concept (HACCP).
- Implementation of measures by water utilities was undertaken either on a voluntary basis or through legislation.
- One Member State reported that it was preparing guidance and factsheets with a software tool and considers sufficient information available to develop an effective response.

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Drinking Water Security

- Most Member States reported that measures for protecting the security of drinking water took the form of an emergency response.
- One member state reported that analysis of its national risk assessment has identified a number of areas requiring improvement and has established a national group to continually review the situation.

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Support at the EU level

- A limited number of Member States reported that security could be considered within the framework of the Drinking Water Directive, although other Member States reported their reluctance for additional legislation.
- Many Member States reported that they would benefit from guidance at EU level and could take the form of sharing best practice and practical tools.

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Requirements suggested by MS

- Best practices and standards for water utility cyber security prepared at the EU level.
- Best practices database on water security prepared at the EU level.
- Workshops and trainings organised to advance and upgrade the knowledge.
- Establishment of risk and crisis management strategies, focussing on preventive security measures and emergency water supply planning.
- Establishing a communication platform where information on drinking water security aspects can be assessed.

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Conclusions

- While EU DWD firmly governs water quality and awareness of WSPs exist, water security measures are often located elsewhere.
- Universal recognition that drinking water infrastructure is a critical asset, but does take account of size.
- Varying levels of preparedness between Member States.
- Considerable support for developing good practice guidelines (not through legislation) based on sharing experiences between Member States.

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