



13.12.2012

1st ERNCIP Conference

Water Supply Security

Threat assessment

Dr. Julia Sasse

Robert Koch-Institut/IBBS, Berlin



History of the Robert Koch-Institut

- 1891 Royal Prussian Institute for Infectious Diseases
- 1912 Royal Prussian Institute for Infectious Diseases 'Robert Koch'
- 1948 Robert Koch Institute for Hygiene and Infectious Diseases
- 1952 Part of the newly founded Federal Health Office
- 1994 Robert Koch Institute



The RKI is the central federal institution for disease control and prevention in Germany

Departments and Units of the RKI

Department of Infectious Diseases

Department of Epidemiology and Health Reporting

Department for Infectious Disease Epidemiology

Centre for Biological Security

Federal Information Centre for Biological Security

ZBS 1 Highly-Pathogenic Viruses

ZBS 2 Highly-Pathogenic Bacteria and Fungi

ZBS 3 Microbial Toxins

ZBS 4 Imaging Techniques; Electron microscopy

ZBS 5 Biosafety-Level 4 Laboratory

ZBS 6 Proteomics and Spectroscopy of Highly
Pathogenic Microorganisms

Project Groups and Junior Research Groups

Natural bacterial contaminations

Major natural contaminations of drinking water supplies



- **1993** Milwaukee (Wisconsin, USA), 800,000 inhabitants:
Cryptosporidium: 403,000 cases, 4,400 hospitalizations
- **1996/7** Dushanbe (Tajikistan), 600,000 inhabitants:
Typhoid fever: 8,901 cases, 95 deaths
- **2000** Walkerton (Canada), 6,000 inhabitants:
E. coli: 2,300 cases, 18 deaths
- **2003** Torgau-Oschatz, Germany, 95 inhabitants in the street:
Norovirus: 88 cases (93%)
- **2010/11** Haiti:
Vibrio cholerae: 519,690 cases, 6,859 deaths

Drinking water contaminations **in the USA in 2007/08**

outbreaks (n=36):

cases (n=4128):

agent



- Bacterium
- Virus
- Parasite
- Chemical
- Multiple
- Unidentified



Persistence in drinking water

Agent	Stability
<i>B. anthracis</i> spores	> 2 years
<i>Brucella</i>	20 - 72 days
<i>Burkholderia mallei</i>	< 30 days
<i>Burkh. pseudomallei</i>	unknown
<i>C. Tetani</i> spores*	> 10 years
<i>Coxiella burnetii</i>	unknown
<i>Francisella tularensis</i>	< 90 days
<i>Legionella pneumophila</i> *	> 40 days (24 °C, 100%)
<i>S. paratyphii</i> *	27-37 days
<i>S. typhii</i> *	2-93 days
<i>S. typhimurium</i> *	> 40 days (24 °C, 100%)

Agent	Stability
<i>Shigella</i>	2 - 3 days
<i>V. cholerae</i>	Survives well
<i>Yersinia pestis</i>	16 days
Enterovirus*	50-200 days
Herpesvirus*	15-25 days
Rhabdovirus*	25 days
Variola	unknown
Botulinum toxin	stable
Ricin	stable
Saxitoxin	stable
SEB	Probably
<i>Cryptosporidium parvum</i>	0,01 log ₁₀ /d (5 °C)

Source: Burrows and Renner, Env. Health Persp., 1999

* Lacombe, lögd nrw, 1999

Persistence in drinking water


Bacteria	25 C	5 C
<i>Brucella suis</i>	2 d	14 d
<i>Brucella melitensis</i>	2 d	14 d
<i>Burkholderia mallei</i>	2 d	2 d
<i>Burkholderia pseudomallei</i>	30 d	2 d
<i>Yersinia pestis</i>	21 d	2 d
<i>Francisella tularensis</i>	1 d	1 d (21-30 d by 8 C)

Source: Gilbert et Rose, Lett. Appl. Microb., 2012

Water systems


Water systems are critical infrastructures for the maintenance of many vital public services

- Human consumption
 - drinking
 - cooking
 - personal hygiene
 - domestic use
 - emergency decontamination
- Industry, industrial hygiene
- Fire fighting
- Power generation
- ...





Vulnerability of water supplies



Berlin

Daily consumption

Population + guests:	57.000.000 L / day
Hospitals and health care facilities:	3.772.500 L / day

Water distribution

Pipes	7830 km
Waterworks	9

-> Sensor placement?

Some tools like

- Threat Ensemble Vulnerability Assessment
- optiMQ-S



Early warning systems

Requirements :

- reliable
- sensitive and specific
- reproducible and verifiable
- wide spectrum of agents, live and dead
- real time available

Technologies:

- microchip array
- immunologic techniques
- microrobots
- optical technologies
- flow cytometry



Preventive measures

Technical:

- Physical barrier, door locks, irruption detector
- Water quality testing, treatment, pretreatment
- Securing of power supply (generators for computers, electronics, automated systems etc.)
- Strategies for emergency water distribution
- Mobile pumps, mobile disinfection equipment, pipes,...

Preventive measures

Organisational:

- Emergency plans for technical support
- Continuous inspection, security patrols
- Restricted access, security checked personnel
- Establishment of crisis management group
- Improvement of fault clearance service
- Telephone list (intern, extern)
- Information material for the public
- Replenishment of water reservoirs, disinfections




Summary

Potential threat of bioterror attacks on water supply

- Equipment is currently not sufficient to analyze most water threats
- Monitoring programs are managed for peacetime compliance
- First evidence of such an attack will likely be casualties at the clinic

Preparations are mandatory, although an attack is most unlikely

- Very complex and complicated
- Limited to local areas



Ozonisation of bottled water, Brazil

Street well in Berlin



Fotos: RKI

Thank you!
Questions?

Contact:

Dr. Julia Sasse, Robert Koch-Institut/IBBS, Seestraße 10, 13353 Berlin, Germany
Tel. +49 (0)3018 754 3721; Fax +49 (0)3018 754 3705; Email: SasseJ@rki.de